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INTRODUCTION

While the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects the freedom of expression, individuals issuing threats or
advocating illegal conduct may be subject to punishment.
What
constitutes proscribable speech has long been evolving, and the recent
jurisprudence suggests that First Amendment protections are more robust
for advocacy of illegal conduct than for threats. Elonis v. United States'
provided the Court with a golden opportunity to clarify First Amendment
threat jurisprudence; however, those hoping for an illuminating analysis
cannot help but be disappointed.
Part I of this Article discusses the developing First Amendment
jurisprudence regarding the regulation of incitement, focusing on how
constitutional protections for such speech have increased over time. Part
II discusses the constitutional limitations on the regulation of threats,
noting the Court's consistent refusal to address what kind of subjective
intent is necessary in order for an individual to be convicted of having
made a threat. Part III focuses on Elonis in particular, explaining how
Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
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the case wasted the opportunity to clarify a number of First Amendment
issues. The article concludes by pointing to several areas the Court may
be forced to address in the not-too-distant future, including some of the
confusions created by the Elonis opinion itself.
I. INCITEMENT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment incitement jurisprudence has been developing
for almost a century. Some of the early cases involved the application of
the Espionage Act to individuals accused of obstructing the draft. The
clear and present danger test used in those cases later evolved into the
Brandenburg test, which focuses on both imminence and the intent to
cause harm. The protections of this test, when applicable, have proven
very difficult to overcome. In Schenck v. United States, 2 the Court
examined the constitutionality of the Espionage Act, which criminalized
"causing and attempting to cause insubordination . . . in the military and
naval forces of the United States," 3 as well as attempting "to obstruct the
recruiting and enlistment service of the United States." 4 The focus of the
prosecution was on a leaflet sent by Schenck, the "general secretary of
the Socialist party,"' to individuals who had been drafted.6 The leaflet
included text from the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution: 7 "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.""
After quoting the constitutional text, the leaflet suggested that the
draft, which involved "despotism in its worst form and a monstrous
wrong against humanity in the interest of Wall Street's chosen few," 9
violated the spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment.' 0 The draft rendered "a
conscript . . . little better than a convict.""

2 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3 Id. at 48-49 (citing Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917) (current version at

18 U.S.C.A. §792 etseq.).
4 Id. at 49.
5 id.
6 Id. at 49-50.
7 See id at 50.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 50-5 1.
'0 Id. at 50.
" Id. at 50-51.
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Urging readers not to submit to intimidation,1 2 the leaflet "in form at
least confined itself to peaceful measures such as a petition for the repeal
of the act." 3 It exhorted individuals to assert their rights for their own
and others' good. 4 "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are
helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all
citizens and residents of the United States to retain."' 5
A number of issues were implicated in Schenck, including the
purpose behind the distribution of the leaflets and whether distributing
them was protected by the First Amendment. 6 Writing for the Court,
Justice Holmes reasoned that "the document[ ] would not have been sent
unless it had been intended to have some effect, and we do not see what
effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft
except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out."" Yet, the
leaflet on its face only advocated legal action such as seeking repeal of
the draft,' and those subject to the draft might have been thought
especially interested in taking concrete steps to have the draft repealed.
Thus, the leaflet might have been designed to urge interested parties to
engage in legal action.
The Schenck Court admitted that the contents of the leaflet would
normally be constitutionally protected.1 9 However, the normal rules may
not apply during times of war, 20 and "the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done.",21 For example, the "most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." 2 2
Why is falsely yelling fire in a crowded theater subject to
punishment? In a crowded theater, there may be no time to figure out
whether such a warning is accurate, and it would be unsurprising for
those packed in the closed space to panic. 23 But Holmes's point that
12

Id at 51.
id
14 See
id.
15 Schenck, 249 U.S.
at 51.
13

16
17

18

d
d

Id
9Id. at 52.
20 id
21 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S.
194, 205-06 (1904)).
22 id
23 Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A
Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom ofSpeech, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 54, 78 (1989).
1
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falsely yelling fire should not be protected is only obviously correct
because of some implicit assumptions, for example, that the individual
knew that there was no fire. If, instead, an individual reasonably but
wrongly believed there was a fire and yelled in order to save lives, then
he presumably should not be prosecuted,24 although perhaps not because
25
of First Amendment guarantees.
The mailing at issue in Schenck was disanalogous to the person
shouting "Fire" in at least two respects. First, unlike the person who was
aware there was no fire and shouted "Fire" nonetheless, Schenck
believed what was said in the leaflet, so he was more analogous to the
individual who sincerely but mistakenly believed that there was a fire.
Second, a mailing received at home, especially one with a political
message attempting to persuade people to do something like work
towards the repeal of the draft,2 6 is much less likely to cause a panic than
is shouting fire in a crowded theater.27 In short, the comparison was
inapt.28

The Schenck Court announced the relevant standard: "[W]hether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 29 By making
constitutional protections turn on "proximity and degree," 30 the Court
implied that judgment was required to determine which kinds of
statements, protected during safer times, nonetheless could be prohibited
because too dangerous to articulate in the circumstances at hand. At
least one difficulty in Schenck was that the mailing did not plausibly
constitute a clear and present danger.3 1
See Mark Strasser, Mill, Holmes, Brandeis and a True Threat to Brandenburg, 26 BYU
J. PUB. L. 37, 44 (2011) (discussing individual who reasonably but falsely yells "Fire!" in
a crowded theater). But cf L.A. Powe, Jr., Searchingfor the False Shout of "Fire,"19
CONST. COMMENT. 345, 348- 49 (2002) (speculating that Holmes's example might have
been based on an event in which an individual had wrongly believed that there was a fire
and then caused a panic when he warned everyone).
25 Cf City of San Angelo Fire Dep't v. Hudson, 179 S.W.3d 695, 706 (3d. Cir. 2005)
(concluding that a fire truck driver is immune from suit for causing accident when "a
reasonable fire truck driver in Hood's [the driver's] position could have believed that his
actions were justified").
26 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying
text.
27 See Strasser, supra note
24.
28 Powe, supra note 24,
at 346.
29 Schenck, 249 U.S.
at 52.
30
d.
31 See Strasser, supra note 24, at 45; see also Floyd Abrams, A
Worthy Tradition: The
Scholar and the FirstAmendment, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1162, 1164 n.16 (1990) (reviewing
24
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Justice Holmes provided further explanation of the Court's First
Amendment approach to incitement in Frohwerk v. United States.3 2
Frohwerk was charged with violating the Espionage Act for his part in
the preparation and publication of a series of anti-war articles in a
newspaper.3 3 One article, ostensibly condemning anti-draft riots,34 was
written "in language that might be taken to convey an innuendo of a
different sort."3 5 The article, "made as moving as the writer was able to
make it," 3 6 recounted the story of a drafted man who became
disillusioned after being sent overseas.37
Justice Holmes explained that Schenck establishes "that a person
may be convicted of a conspiracy to obstruct recruiting by words of
persuasion," 38 although there are circumstances, even during wartime,
when printing articles critical of the government's policies would not be
a crime.39 After all, the newspaper had not targeted individuals subject
to the draft4 o and the paper had a small circulation. 4 1 Nonetheless, the
Court was unwilling to overturn the conviction of conspiracy to obstruct
recruitment 42 because "the circulation of the paper was in quarters where
a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that . . . fact was
known and relied upon by those who sent the paper out." 4 3 Once again,
the Court's willingness to affirm the conviction in light of the recently
announced "clear and present danger" test4 4 suggested the burden thereby
imposed was not particularly onerous, because the Court refused to

HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988)

(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (discussing how "difficult ... the affirmance of Schenck's
conviction is to comprehend today").
32 249 U.S. 204 (1919).

33 Id. at 205.
34 See id. at 207.
35
d.
36
d.
37 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 207.
38
1Id. at 206.
39
Id. at 208.
40
41
42

id.
id.
See id. at 209.

43 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209.
44 Michael C. Shaughnessy, Comment, Praising the Enemy: Could the United States

Criminalize the Glorification of Terror under an Act Similar to the United Kingdom's
Terrorism Act 2006?, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 923, 952 n.200 (2009) ("Frohwerk did not

explicitly rely upon the clear and present danger test articulated in Schenck, but the Court
nevertheless cited the earlier opinion in its reasoning.").
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overturn the conviction based on the mere possibility that the publication
might result in obstruction.45
Debs v. United States4 also illustrated that the clear and present
danger test was relatively easy to meet. Debs gave a public speech and
was accused of having "obstructed and attempted to obstruct the
recruiting and enlistment service of the United States."4 " The Court
described the address, noting that Debs had begun by saying that "he had
just returned from a visit to the workhouse in the neighborhood where
three of their most loyal comrades were paying the penalty for their
devotion to the working class[,] . . . ha[ving] been convicted of aiding
and abetting another in failing to register for the draft." 4 9 Debs explained
that "he had to be prudent and might not be able to say all that he
thought,"o which the Court took to be "intimating to his hearers that they
might infer that he meant more."
The Court reviewed Debs's trial, noting that he had announced to the
jury that that he was opposed to war.5 2 But if Debs's opposition to war
was also reflected in his public address and if "one purpose of the
speech . .
was to oppose not only war in general but this war, and
that . . . opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended effect
would be to obstruct recruiting,"53 then the conviction could withstand a
constitutional challenge.
Although there was no evidence of the prohibited expression in
Debs, Frohwerk, or Schenck having caused a disturbance," Eugene Debs
was a great orator who had thousands of followers. 6 His words might
have been expected to have a greater impact than the published words at
45 Lieutenant Dennis R. Neutze, JAGC, USN, Yardsticks of Expression in the Military

Environment, 27 JAG J. 180, 187 (1973) (discussing "the Court's reliance inFrohwerkon

the jury's finding of the size of the possible conflagration caused by an admittedly
speculative spark").
46 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
47 See Abrams, supra note 31, at 1163 (discussing "the even more disastrous Debs v.

United States").
48 Debs, 249 U.S. at 212.
49

Id. at 212-13.
Id. at 213.
51 Id.
52
Id. at 214.
53
1Id. at 214-15.
54 Debs, 249 U.S. at 215.
55 Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First
Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 17 (1990).
56 Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1538 (1998).
50
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issue in Frohwerk;5 7 yet Debs had consciously limited what he said out
of prudence, 8 perhaps because he realized that there were individuals in
the crowd hoping to use his words against him in a court of law.59 Just as
the Schenck Court had noted that while the words themselves had not
crossed the line it was safe to assume that promotion of illegal activity
was the goal,o the Debs Court seemed to adopt that same approach of
imputing a desire to promote illegal activity.6 1
One difficulty with the approach employed by the Court in Debs,
Frohwerk, and Schenck is that individuals contemplating making certain
statements would not know prospectively whether their speech was
constitutionally protected-the line between protected and unprotected
speech was difficult to discern.62 An additional difficulty was that the
Court seemed to uphold convictions for speech that had been carefully
crafted to be on the correct side of the law based on the Court's fear that
the audience might read between the lines 63 and infer a meaning that
would likely have been subject to criminal sanction if stated expressly.
In Abrams v. United States,5 the defendants were charged inter alia
with attempting to interfere with the production of war materials.
Fearing that munitions would be used against Russia, the defendants

Cf Judah A. Druck, Droning on: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect
of Technology-Driven Warfare, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 209, 224 (2012).
58 Debs, 249 U.S. at
213.
5

Nathan Goetting, A Perfect Peace Too Horrible to Contemplate: Justice Holmes and
the Perpetual Conviction of Eugene Victor Debs, 63 GULD PRAC. 135, 140 (2006) ("He
5

[Debs] knew that agents would be out there among the auditors, sniffing at every word,
trying to make the case that his speech had obstructed the draft; so he chose his words
carefully.").

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
62 See Mark D. Salsbury, Questions of Vagueness and State Constitutional
Legitimacy:
The State ConstitutionalChallenge to Minnesota's Obscenity Statute: State v. Davidson,
481 N. W2d 51 (Afinn. 1992), 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 281, 308 (1992) (noting that "when
60
61

[a] statute involves speech that may be protected by the First Amendment, the
requirement of fair notice is particularly important").
Cf David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1262 (1983) (discussing "Holmes's reliance on possible innuendo").
64 Michele Munn, The Effects of Free Speech: Mass Communication Theory and the
Criminal Punishment of Speech, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 433, 455 (1994) ("Debs would chill
63

political speech because it would be hard to criticize the war effort without falling under
the umbrella of criminal intent to obstruct the recruiting of troops.").
65 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
66
Id. at 617.
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attempted to dissuade munitions workers from performing their jobs.
The Abrams Court reasoned that "[m]en must be held to have intended,
and to be accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely to
produce,"
and the intended result of their work stoppage would have
been to aid Germany, a country with whom the United States was at
war.6 " The Court seemed to incorporate the test that had been used in the
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, decisions all authored by Justice
Holmes.69 However, Justice Holmes dissented in Abrams, noting the
defendants were not German sympathizers, 70 and suggesting that the
intent to aid Germany could not fairly be attributed to the defendants.
"[A] deed is not done with intent to produce a consequence unless that
consequence is the aim of the deed." 72 Holmes did not believe that the
mere likelihood of hindering the war effort would or should suffice as a
basis for* conviction. 73
A patriot might think that we were wasting money on
aeroplanes, or making more cannon of a certain kind
than we needed, and might advocate curtailment with
success, yet even if it turned out that the curtailment
hindered and was thought by other minds to have been
obviously likely to hinder the United States in the
prosecution of the war, no one would hold such conduct
74
a crime.
Justice Holmes was correct that a patriot who persuaded others that
we should spend less on planes should not be punished, even if that
advocacy impeded a war effort. But that point is not particularly helpful
without further discussion of why that is so. Suppose, for example, that
the individual persuading others to reduce expenditures on the air force
67 Id.
67

at 620-2 1.
Id. at 621.
68 See id. at 617 (noting that "the United States was at war with the Imperial Government
of Germany").
69 See Rabban, supra note 63 at 1208 (discussing the "postwar opinions
by Holmes in
Schenck v. United States, Frohwerkv. United States, and Debs v. United States").
70 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 625 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("A note adds 'It
is absurd to call us
pro-German. We hate and despise German militarism more than do you hypocritical
tyrants. We have more reason for denouncing German militarism than has the coward of
the White House."').
71 id.
72
Id. at 627.
73 id.
74 id.
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was not a patriot but, instead, was someone who simply wanted a lower
tax burden. That still would not have provided the basis for prosecution,
even though his actions would have (foreseeably and actually)
contributed to weakening the military and those actions would not have
been motivated by patriotism. But if even the non-patriot who advocates
for a reduction in air force expenditures should not be punished, then
there are more relevant considerations than whether particular conduct is
likely to undermine the war effort and whether the person's motivation is
patriotic.
Justice Holmes's discussion in his Abrams dissent of the patriot who
sought to divert airplane funding to other sources suggests that Holmes'
focus was not purely on the probability of an action having negative
consequences, although he also implied that the leaflets at issue could
not reasonably have been thought likely to harm government efforts.
"[N]obody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet
by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger
that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or
have any appreciable tendency to do so."7
While Justice Holmes may
have been correct about the likelihood that these flyers would hurt the
war effort, the implicit standard adopted in Frohwerk doomed Abrams,
because "circulation of the [circular] . . . in quarters where a little breath
would be enough to kindle a flame"78 sufficed to uphold the conviction.
Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, and Abrams offer the following test to
determine whether speech can be criminalized: if there is a clear and
present danger that the speech at issue will cause the kind of harm that is
within the power of the state to prevent, then the First Amendment will
not protect the speech at issue. 7 9 Arguably, that test was misapplied in
that convictions were upheld even when the expression at issue did not
pose a clear and present danger.so However, that test was supplanted
with a more protective test in Brandenburgv. Ohio."'

5

7

Id. at 625-27.

76 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 626, 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
77Id. at 628
78 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919).

Cf Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951) ("[A] conviction relying upon
speech ... as evidence of violation may be sustained only when the speech ... created a
'clear and present danger' of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime, e.g.,
interference with enlistment").
80 See supra notes 30, 44, and 74 and accompanying text.
81 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
79
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At issue in Brandenburg was Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute,
which "punishe[d] persons who 'advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or
propriety' of violence 'as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform."' 8 2 A Ku Klux Klan leader had invited a TV reporter to a Klan
rally.83 The rally was filmed, some of which was later broadcast on
TV,1 4 including a speech by the appellant: "We're not a revengent
organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there
might have to be some revengeance taken.""' Another film showed the
appellant expressing his opinion that "the nigger should be returned to
Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.", 6 Some of the individuals in the film
carried weapons. 7 The leader was convicted under Ohio law,"" and he
appealed.89
Striking down the statute as unconstitutional, the Court explained
that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action." 90 This standard was distinct from the clear and present danger
test 91 in its emphasis both on imminence and on the likelihood of the
82

Id. at 448.

Id. at 444-45 ("The record shows that a man, identified at trial as the appellant,
telephoned an announcer-reporter on the staff of a Cincinnati television station and
invited him to come to a Ku Klux Klan 'rally' to be held at a farm in Hamilton County.").
84 Id. ("With the cooperation of the organizers, the reporter and a cameraman
attended the
meeting and filmed the events. Portions of the films were later broadcast on the local
station and on a national network.").
83

5

86

Id. at 446.
Id. at 447.

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 ("[S]ome of the figures in the films carried weapons").
Id. at 444 ("The appellant, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under the
Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute").
8 See id. at 445 ("Appeal was taken to this Court").
87

90 Id. at 447, 449.

91 See Susan M. Gilles, Brandenburg v. State of Ohio: An "Accidental," "Too Easy, " and
"Incomplete" Landmark Case, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 520 (2010) ("Brandenburgis

famous for abandoning the 'clear and present danger' test"); John P. Cronan, The Next
Challengefor the FirstAmendment: The Frameworkfor an Internet Incitement Standard,
51 CATH. U. L. REv. 425, 438 (2002) ("the [Brandenburg] Court repudiated the 'clear and

present danger' test and brought into power the modern-day incitement test"); cf
Brandenburg, 395 U.S.

at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring) ("I agree with the views

expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in this case that the 'clear and
present danger' doctrine should have no place in the interpretation of the First
Amendment.").
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harm. 92 The Court did not discuss whether Brandenburg could also be
understood as a case involving threats in addition to incitement. 93
Hess v. Indiana94 provided further explanation of Brandenburg.
Hess had taken part in an antiwar demonstration at Indiana University. 95
While police were clearing the streets, he had said that "[w]e'll take the
fucking street later" 96 or, perhaps, "[w]e'll take the fucking street
again." 97 When making this comment, he "did not appear to be exhorting
the crowd to go back into the street," 98 although he was facing the crowd
and did not appear to be speaking to anyone in particular.99 Hess was
convicted of disorderly conduct. 00
The Indiana Supreme Court interpreted Hess' speech as advocacy of
illegal conduct that was likely to occur.' 0'
But the United States
Supreme Court concluded the speech "at worst . . . amounted to nothing
more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time,"102
and thus was "not sufficient to permit the State to punish Hess'
speech."1 0 3 The lack of imminence meant the speech at issue could not
be criminalized under Brandenburg.i04 The Court did not address
whether Hess' statement could have been interpreted as a threat and, if
so, what constitutional test would be applied to determine whether such a
threat would be constitutionally protected. 1o
92 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447, 449.
93 Cf Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion?, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 23 (2002) ("The speech

that the Court ... found protected under Brandenburg did indeed amount to threats of
physical harm.").
94 414 U.S. 105 (1973).

9 Id. at 106 ("The events leading to Hess' conviction began with an antiwar
demonstration on the campus of Indiana University.").
96 Id. at 106-07.
97

Id. at 107.

98 Id.

9 Id.
100 Hess, 414 U.S. at 105 ("Gregory Hess appeals from his conviction in the Indiana
courts for violating the State's disorderly conduct statute.").
101 Id. at 108 ("The Indiana Supreme Court placed primary reliance on the trial court's
finding that Hess' statement 'was intended to incite further lawless action on the part of
the crowd in the vicinity of appellant and was likely to produce such action."') (citing

Hess v. State, 297 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ind. 1973)).
102 Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
103 Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
104 id.
105 See Jordan Strauss, Context Is Everything: Towards a More Flexible
Rule for
Evaluating True Threats under the FirstAmendment, 32 Sw. U. L. REv. 231, 246 (2003)

("The Court ... avoided discussing Hess' statement as a threat"); see also Rohr, supra
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N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., which involved a First
Amendment challenge to an imposition of damages resulting from a
boycott, further explicated Brandenburg.'0 6
The Claiborne County
chapter of the NAACP sought to promote the hiring of "Negro clerks and
cashiers"' 0 7 by local stores. When demands for equal opportunity were
not received favorably, the NAACP voted to boycott white merchants. 0 s
Charles Evers, one of the boycott organizers, stated that "boycott
violators would be 'disciplined' by their own people and warned that the
Sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night."1 09 Evers
reportedly said during one speech: "If we catch any of you going in any
of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck.""10
Some incidents involving violence against African-Americans
willing to patronize white merchants allegedly occurred before Evers had
made these statements,"' but there were no identified incidents after
these speeches.11 2 That said, however, punishments were inflicted on
those who did not participate in the boycott." 3 The ClaiborneHardware
Court noted that "names of boycott violators were read aloud at meetings
at the First Baptist Church and published in a local black newspaper,"
which was characterized as an attempt "to persuade others to join the
boycott through social pressure and the 'threat' of social ostracism.""'
The Court found the state could not "prohibit peaceful political activity
such as that found in the boycott in this case."i
While the First Amendment protects speech, it does not protect
violence or threats of violence,i 7 and "there [was] no question that acts
of violence occurred.""" Nonetheless, because the First Amendment

note 93, at 10 ("Hess involved a participant in an antiwar demonstration on a university
campus whose speech can best be characterized as a statement of intent to take illegal
action in the future-a statement that can also be described as a threat").
106 See 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982).
107 Id. at 899-900.
108

Id. at 900.

109 Id. at 902.
110 Id.

...
Id. at 903 ("[The chancellor] ... did identify, however, several significant incidents of
boycott-related violence that occurred some years earlier.").
112 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 903 ("The chancellor identified no incident of
violence that occurred after the suit was brought.").
113 Id. at 903-04.

Id. at 909.
Id. at 909-10.
116
Id. at 913.
117 Id. at 916 ("The First Amendment does not protect
violence.").
"" ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 916.
114
115
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was implicated, "'precision of regulation' [was] demanded.""l 9 The
Court reasoned that the boycotters "withheld their patronage from the
white establishment of Claiborne County to challenge a political and
economic system that had denied them the basic rights of dignity and
equality."1 20 This made it rather difficult to tell which losses should be
attributed to threats of violence rather than to protected activity,12 1 i.e.,
which losses could be attributed to intimidation rather than to a voluntary
decision not to patronize certain businesses out of a common desire to
bring about change.
The Court examined the speech of Evers.122 "While many of the
comments in Evers' speeches might have contemplated 'discipline' in
the permissible form of social ostracism, it cannot be denied that
references to the possibility that necks would be broken and to the fact
that the Sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night implicitly
conveyed a sterner message.,,123
However, the Court reasoned that
"[s]trong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely
channeled in purely dulcet phrases."l24 Had violence resulted from his
speeches, "a substantial question would be presented whether Evers
could be held liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct."l1 25
However, because no violence resulted and because "there [was] no
evidence-apart from the speeches themselves-that Evers authorized,
ratified, or directly threatened acts of violence,"l26 the judgment of
damages could not withstand the constitutional challenge. 127
The Court justified its holding by noting that "mere advocacy of the
use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of
the First Amendment.",1 28 The Court neither announced nor applied a test
to determine the conditions under which threats were constitutionally

"9 Id. (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
120 ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S.
at 918.

Id. ("While the State legitimately may impose damages for the consequences of
violent conduct, it may not award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent,
protected activity. Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct may be
recovered.").
122 Id. at 926-27.
123 Id. at 927.
124 Id. at 928.
125 id.
126 Id. at 929.
121

127

Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 929 ("The findings are constitutionally inadequate

to support the damages judgment against him.").
128 Id. at 927.
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protected. It was unclear whether Brandenburg, Hess, and Claiborne
Hardwarewere implicitly applying a constitutional test protecting threats
in some circumstances,1 29 or whether, instead, the Court was simply
leaving that issue to be determined on another day.
II. THREATS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The articulated constitutional protections implicated in cases
involving threats differ from those implicated in the advocacy of illegal
action. The focus in the former jurisprudence has been on whether the
statement at issue was a threat rather than a joke or political statement
rather than on whether the threatened action was imminent. But this
focus means that the Court has neither explained whether threats fall
under the Brandenburganalysis nor, if not, why they do not. 30
A. Watts
Watts v. United States'3 ' involved Robert Watts who, during a public
rally in the District of Columbia, said that he had already received his
112
draft classification but was not planning on showing up.
He then
added that "[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get
in my sights is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black
brothers."' 33 Based on this statement, Watts was convicted of making a
threat against President Lyndon Baines Johnson.14
The Supreme Court cautioned that a statute criminalizing speech
(criminalizing the making of a threat against the President of the United
States)'3 5 had to comport with constitutional guarantees. 3 6 After noting
that "the statute initially requires the Government to prove a true
Cf Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the FirstAmendment
Value of Threats,
78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 549 (2000) ("the doctrine emerging from Watts, Brandenburg, and
129

Hess protects potentially serious threats").
130 Cf Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 283, 329 (2001) ("The Supreme Court's analysis of threats inN4ACP v. Claiborne

Hardware suggests that the requirements of Brandenburg are not the test for threats, but
that they apply when no true threat has been shown."). But see supra note 129.
131 394 U.S. 705 (1969).

Id at 706 ("And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have
got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going.").
133 id
134 Id ("On the basis of this statement, the jury found that petitioner
had committed a
felony by knowingly and willfully threatening the President.").
135 See 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1962) (amended
1994).
132

136

Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
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'threat,"' 3 7 the Court rejected that "the kind of political hyperbole
indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term." 38 Instead, the
Court agreed that the petitioner's "only offense here was 'a kind of very
crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the
President."' 3 9
One issue is whether a statement can plausibly be construed as a
threat as opposed to a joke or political hyperbole. A related issue is
whether an apparently threatening statement might credibly be thought to
pose any danger.
B. Rogers
4
Rogers v. United Stateso
involved statements made by George
Rogers about what he would do to President Richard Nixon. 141 Early one
morning, Rogers, an alcoholic, came into a coffee shop in Shreveport,
Louisiana,1 42 where he reportedly said that "he was Jesus Christ and that
he was opposed to President Nixon's visiting China because the Chinese
had a bomb that only he knew about, which might be used against the
people of this country."l43 In addition, Rogers proclaimed that "he was
going to go to Washington to 'whip Nixon's ass,' or to 'kill him in order
to save the United States."'14 4
The police were called. 145
The arresting officer asked Rogers
whether he had threatened the President, 4 6 and Rogers had said he did
not approve of "the idea of the President's going to China and making
friends with the Chinese, our enemies. ,47
Rogers then stated: "I'm
going to Washington and I'm going to beat his ass off. Better yet, I will

137 Id. at 708.

id.
id.
140 422 U.S. 35 (1975).
138
139

Id. at 41-42 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Rogers announced that he was going to go to
Washington to 'whip Nixon's ass,' or to 'kill him in order to save the United States."').
142
Id. at 41.
143 Id. at 41-42.
144
Id. at 42.
145 Rogers, 422 U.S. at 42 (Marshall, J., concurring).
146 id.
147 Id.
141
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go kill him." 4 s Rogers, who did not like cars, suggested that he would
walk to D.C.,1 49 a distance of about 1,200 miles by road.5 0
Rogers was not charged with any crimes under state law, but a Secret
Service agent who was informed of the incident had Rogers arrested
under a federal warrant.'' The jury who had convicted Rogers had been
told that "it was not required to find that [Rogers] actually intended to
kill or injure the President, or even that he made a statement that he
thought might be taken as a serious threat."15 2 Rather, "the jury was
permitted to convict on a showing merely that a reasonable man in
[Rogers'] place would have foreseen that the statements he made would
be understood as indicating a serious intention to commit the act."'5 3
Even when given this instruction, the jury had been unsure what to
do. ' 4 After two hours of deliberating, the foreman sent a note to the
judge asking whether "the court would accept the Verdict-'Guilty as
charged with extreme mercy of the Court.""
When the judge answered
in the affirmative, the jury rendered a verdict within five minutes. ' 6 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 5 7 The Supreme
Court worried "the trial judge's response may have induced unanimity by
giving members of the jury who had previously hesitated about reaching
a guilty verdict the impression that the recommendation might be an
acceptable compromise." 5 The Court noted the trial court judge did not
"remind[] the jury that the recommendation would not be binding in any
way"59 and did not "include[] the admonition that the jury had no
sentencing function and should reach its verdict without regard to what
sentence might be imposed.", 6 0 Accordingly, the Court reversed the
circuit court and remanded the case.
148

id.
id.
150 Distance from Washington, DC to Shreveport,
LA, DISTANCE BETWEEN CITIES,
http://www.distance-cities.com/distance-washington-dc-to-shreveport-la
(last visited
October 28, 2015) ("There are 1,035 miles from Washington and Shreveport and 1,196
miles by car.").
151 Rogers, 422 U.S. at 42 (Marshall, J., concurring).
152
Id. at 43.
153 Id. at 43-44.
154 Id. at 40 (majority opinion).
155 Id. at
36.
156 Id. at
37.
157 United States v. Rogers, 488 F.2d 512 (5th
Cir. 1974).
15s Rogers, 422 U.S. at 40.
159 id.
149

160 Id. (citing United States v. Louie Gim Hall, 245 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1957)).
161

Id. at 41.
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In his concurrence, Justice Marshall argued that the statute
"require[s] proof that the speaker intended his statement to be taken as a
threat, even if he had no intention of actually carrying it out."1 6 2 The
statute had prohibited "knowingly and willfully . . . [making a] threat
against the President," 63 which Justice Marshall interpreted as including
a requirement that the speaker understand that his speech would likely be
interpreted as communicating a threat rather than an expression of
disapproval of Nixon's actions or policies. 6' 4 However, the Court did not
need to address the proper construction of the statute because of the
65
procedural irregularity that had occurred at trial.1
C. Black
In Virginia v. Black, 6 6 the Court offered further discussion of what
constitutes a threat. 6 7 At issue was the constitutionality of a Virginia
law banning cross-burning with an intent to intimidate. 6 Individuals in
two different cases had been convicted of violating the statute. One case
involved Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara, who had attempted to
bum a cross in the yard of a neighbor, James Jubilee.1 69 Apparently,
Jubilee complained to Elliott's mother about shots that had been fired in
the Elliott's backyard.1 70 The cross had been burned in Jubilee's yard to
punish him for complaining about the shooting.
When Jubilee saw the
partially burned cross in his yard the following day, he became very
nervous, not knowing what to expect.1 72 Neither Elliott nor O'Mara was
affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan.1 73

Id. at 48 (Marshall, J. concurring).
See Rothman, supra note 130 (including the text of the statute).
164 See Rogers, 422 U.S. at 42 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
165 See id at 42-43.
166 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
167
Id. at 357.
168 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (West 1983); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 365 (striking
down part of the statute that made the burning itself prima facie evidence); Elliott v.
Com., 593 S.E.2d 263, 267 (Va. 2004) (recognizing the statute as unconstitutional)
(" [W]e affirm our prior holding that the prima facie evidence provision of Code § 18.2423 is overbroad.").
162
163

169 Black, 538 U.S. at 350.
170

id.
id.
172 id.
173 id
171
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'

In the other case, Barry Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally on private
property with the permission of the owner. 7 4 "At the conclusion of the
rally, they set fire to a 25-30 foot cross." 75 The property was located
near a state highway, 7' 6 and the cross burning was visible from the
road. 7 7 The police reported that an African American family had seen
the burning cross and sped away in a car.17 Black was apprehended,
charged, and convicted of violating the law.1 79
An onlooker (a relative of the property owner) watched the rally.'8 0
After hearing various racist comments, she, "a white neighbor,"' 8
82
testified that she felt "very . . . scared"1
and that "the cross burning
83
'terrible.'"1
and
'awful'
made her feel
The plurality began its analysis of these convictions under the
Virginia statute by defining a true threat. "'True threats' encompass
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals."
Regrettably, this
definition leaves open a number of issues.
It is not entirely clear what counts as an intentional communication
of a serious expression of an intent to commit harm. Suppose an
individual purposely says something that a reasonable individual would
interpret as an intent to commit harm. Would that qualify? The answer
depends upon whether the person must subjectively wish to
communicate an intent to harm or whether, instead, the person merely
has to intentionally say something that might be interpreted as
threatening, even if the speaker has no desire to issue a threat.
The Court did not specify whether the threat must be made to the
threatened individual or group or whether, instead, a communication to
someone who is not the subject of the threat will suffice. For example,
even assuming that Rogers intended to harm President Nixon, the threat
Id. at 348.
Black, 538 U.S. at 349.
176 Id. at 348.
177 See id at
349.
178 See Shannon McCaffrey, Cross-burninglaw gets a hearing Va.
case could shed light
on free
speech
vs.
hate
speech,
PHLLY.COM
(Dec.
9,
2002),
http://articles.philly.com/2002-12-09/news/25358936_1_cross-burning-law-jonathan-omara-flaming-cross.
179 See Black, 538 U.S. at
349-50.
174
175

180

Id. at 348.

See McCaffrey supra note 178.
Black, 538 U.S. at 349.
183 id
184
Id. at 359.
181
182
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was not made to Nixon. Rogers would not have been subject to
prosecution if there was a requirement that the threat be made to the
individual subject to the threat. So, too, while the speakers at the Klan
rally "talked real bad about the blacks and the Mexicans,"s5 there were
presumably no minorities attending the rally at whom the threat was
directed, although minorities might have passed by the rally while
traveling on the state road. ' 6 Even had it been true that no minorities
had seen the cross burning, the rally nonetheless was presumably
communcating a serious threat against other individuals.
Intimidation is "a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat
to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in
fear of bodily harm or death. "'7 The plurality noted that "cross burning
sometimes carries no intimidating message, at other times the
intimidating message is the only message conveyed."'
When would a
cross burning not be intimidating? "For its own members, [burning] the
cross was a sign of celebration and ceremony."'8 However, "when a
cross burning is directed at a particular person not affiliated with the
Klan, the burning cross often serves as a message of intimidation,
designed to inspire in the victim a fear of bodily harm." 90
Perhaps a cross burning would not be seen as intimidating if the only
persons seeing it were members of the group,191 although even a member
of that group might feel intimidated if, for example, he found himself
questioning the group's purposes or goals. But even if the possible
reactions of a doubting member are not considered, the Klan cross
burning at issue in Black was visible to passersby and thus might well
have been intimidating to them, even if it was not intimidating to
members of the group.1 92 Thus, it was inaccurate to suggest that this
cross burning was either intimidating or non-intimidating, since it might
have been both,1 93 given the differing individuals likely to have seen it.
At least one question raised in Black is whether the Klan's burning a
cross near a public highway should be interpreted as directing the

Id. at 349.
McCaffrey, supra note 178.
187 Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
188 Id. at 357 (emphasis in original).
185
186

189 Id. at 356.
190 Id. at 357.
191 Id. at 365-66.

Id. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
193 Black, 538 U.S. at 381.
192
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message of the burning cross to those who happen to drive along the
state route or, instead, whether the only individuals to whom the message
is directed are the Klan members, themselves. Suppose that Black had
said he wanted to burn the cross to express solidarity with the other
members of the Klan and that others seeing the burning cross and
becoming fearful would have pleased Black, even if he had not
specifically intended to bring about that fear. Would that have counted
as an intimidating threat because he had a reckless disregard for whether
any passersby might have become fearful? Further, because threats
include more than intimidating statements, his communicating to likeminded individuals a threat of harm to others might still constitute
communcation of a threat, even if those at whom the threat was directed
were not present to hear the threat. Returning to Rogers, the difficulty
there was in whether Rogers was really making a threat rather than in
whether the President could be threatened even if he did not receive and
was unlikely to receive the threat.
A separate issue is whether Black's communication of a threat
against others violated existing law. But the resolution of that issue does
not somehow determine whether the statement can be classified as a
threat at all.
Still another issue was whether any of the cross-burners intended to
harm anyone. It may be that Elliott and O'Mara had no intention of
physically harming Jubilee or any member of his family, just as Black
and the other Klan members attending the rally might not have intended
to harm passersby. But the Court made clear that the intention to carry
out the threat is not required to be convicted of having made a threat.1 9 4
Black leaves open what kind of subjective intent is required before
an individual can be convicted of having made a threat. It seems pretty
clear that Elliott and O'Mara wanted to scare Jubilee, even if they
intended to do nothing further, which suffices to establish that they
threatened him. A surprising aspect of the Black opinion was its failure
to issue a remand to determine whether the intent behind burning the
cross near a state highway was solely to express solidarity with others
who were like-minded or whether, in addition, there had been (1) an
attempt to intimidate passersby who did not share Klan values, or (2) a
communication to like-minded individuals of a threat against others.

194

Id. at 359-60 (majority opinion).
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III. ELoNis

Elonis v. United States195 had the potential to clear up numerous
constitutional questions, for example, whether incitement and threats are
subject to the same constitutional protections and, if not, why not.
Further, the Court might have described the kind of subjective intent
required before one could be prosecuted for either incitement or threats.
Regrettably, the Court shed very little light on these constitutional
questions, and its statutory analysis offered too little direction to be
helpful for lower courts.1 96
A. Elonis Background
After his wife and children moved out of their home,1 97 Anthony
Elonis made various postings on the internet that caused others to fear for
their physical safety.1 98 His family's leaving caused him great distresshe broke down crying at his job on several occasions and was so upset
that he could not work.1 99
Elonis was accused of sexually harassing a woman with whom he
worked. 20 0 He later posted a photograph on Facebook where he and that
woman were dressed in Halloween attire and he was holding a knife to
her neck.2 0 1 Next to that photo, he wrote, "I wish." 2 02 Elonis's
supervisor saw the photo and caption and fired Elonis that very day. 203
After recounting the series of events involving the Halloween
costumes, the Supreme Court noted that "Elonis was not Facebook
friends with the co-worker and did not 'tag' her, a Facebook feature that

195

135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).

196

See id at 2013 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Court's

disposition of this case is certain to cause confusion and serious problems.").
197

Id. at 2004 (majority opinion).

Id at 2005 ("Elonis's co-workers and friends viewed the posts in a different light.
Around Halloween of 2010, Elonis posted a photograph of himself and a co-worker at a
'Halloween Haunt' event at the amusement park where they worked. In the photograph,
Elonis was holding a toy knife against his co-worker's neck, and in the caption Elonis
198

wrote, 'I wish."').
199 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013), rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 2001
(2015).
200

id.

201

Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.

202

id.
id.

203
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would have alerted her to the posting." 20 4 Although the Court did not
explain why Elonis's failure to alert her about the posting was relevant,
that may have been because the failure to alert supported the claim that
the posting was a way to vent anger or frustration rather than to have
issued a threat.205
Elonis posted other violent statements, including one about his
estranged wife, Tara: "If I only knew then what I know now, I would
have smothered your ass with a pillow, dumped your body in the back
seat, dropped you off in Toad Creek, and made it look like a rape and
murder."

206

Elonis posted the following on his sister-in-law's Facebook page:
There's one way to love you but a thousand ways to kill
you. I'm not going to rest until your body is a mess,
soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts. Hurry
up and die, bitch, so I can bust this nut all over your
corpse from atop your shallow grave. I used to be a nice
guy but then you became a slut. Guess it's not your fault
you liked your daddy raped you. So hurry up and die,
bitch, so I can forgive you. 207
Based on this posting, Tara Elonis was able to secure an order of
protection against her husband. 208 The protective order did not dissuade
him from posting additional threatening statements.209 On the contrary,
he seemed infuriated by the order. One of his postings stated:
Did you know that it's illegal for me to say I want to kill
my wife?
It's illegal.
It's indirect criminal contempt.
It's one of the only sentences that I'm not allowed to
say.
Now it was okay for me to say it right then because I
was just telling you that it's illegal for me to say I want
to kill my wife.
204
205
206
207
208
209

id.
Id. at 2007.
Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324.
id.
id.
id.
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I'm not actually saying it.
I'm just letting you know that it's illegal for me to say
that.
It's kind of like a public service.
I'm letting you know so that you don't accidently go out
and say something like that
Um, what's interesting is that it's very illegal to say I
really, really think someone out there should kill my
wife.
That's illegal.
Very, very illegal.
But not illegal to say with a mortar launcher.
Because that's its own sentence.
It's an incomplete sentence but it may have nothing to
do with the sentence before that. So that's perfectly fine.
Perfectly legal.2 10
Elonis also sought to educate the
understanding of true threat jurisprudence:

public

about the proper

Fold up your PFA [protection from abuse order] and put
it in your pocket Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?
Try to enforce an Order
That was improperly granted in the first place Me thinks
the judge needs an education on true threat jurisprudence
And prison time will add zeroes to my settlement
Which you won't see a lick
Because you suck dog dick in front of children
And if worse comes to worse
I've got enough explosives to take care of the state
police and the sheriffs department. 211
Tara Elonis testified that she took these statements to be threats
against her and her children.2 12 She also testified that she felt as if she
and her children were being stalked.2 13
210 Id. at 324-25.
211 Id. at 325-26.

Elonis, 730 F.3d at 325 ("Tara Elonis testified at trial that she took these statements
seriously, saying, 'Jfelt like I was being stalked. I felt extremely afraid for mine and my
212
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Elonis talked about other ways that he might become
famous.
That's it, I've had about enough
I'm checking out and making a name for myself
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius to
initiate the most heinous school shooting ever imagined
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten
class
The only question is . .. which one? 2 14
An FBI agent, Denise Stevens, had been monitoring Elonis's public
Facebook postings.21 Agent Stevens went to interview Elonis. 216 After
that, Elonis posted again:
Little Agent Lady stood so close
Took all the strength I had not to turn the bitch ghost
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat Leave
her bleedin' from her jugular in the arms of her partner
[laughter]
So the next time you knock, you best be serving a
warrant
And bring yo' SWAT and an explosives expert while
you're at it
Cause little did y'all know, I was strapped wit' a bomb
Why do you think it took me so long to get dressed with
no shoes on?
I was jus' waitin' for y'all to handcuff me and pat me
down
Touch the detonator in my pocket and we're all goin'
[BOOM!] 2 17
Elonis was arrested for transmitting threats against another person
via communications in interstate commerce. 2 18 He argued his statements

children's and my families' lives."') (citing Transcript of Record at 97, United States v.
Elonis, 2011 WL 5024284 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011)).
213
214
215
216
217

id.
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were protected speech, 2 19 but the district court held that whether he had
made true threats was a matter for the jury to decide. 2 20 Elonis also
challenged the jury instruction that had been offered:

'

A statement is a true threat when a defendant
intentionally makes a statement in a context or under
such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those
to whom the maker communicates the statement as a
serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury
or take the life of an individual.2 2
Elonis argued that the jury instruction was incorrect because "the
speaker must both intend to communicate and intend for the language to
threaten the victim."222 But the Third Circuit rejected that the speaker
had to intend for his speech to be threatening-"[1]imiting the definition
of true threats to only those statements where the speaker subjectively
intended to threaten would fail to protect individuals from 'the fear of
violence' and the 'disruption that fear engenders,' because it would
protect speech that a reasonable speaker would understand to be
threatening." 2 23 Here, the Third Circuit was attempting to apply the
reasoning offered in Black, where the Court denied that for a speaker to
make a threat he must in addition intend to carry it out. 224 The Court
justified its refusal to require an intent to carry out the threat by noting
that a prohibition on true threats "protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence" and "from the disruption that fear engenders," in addition to
protecting people "from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur."225

The Black Court and the Third Circuit were addressing differing
aspects of the true threat jurisprudence. Basically, the Black Court was
suggesting that one could issue a threat without intending to carry it out,
whereas the Third Circuit was suggesting that one could issue what
218 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 326.
219 Id. at 327.
220
Id. (citing United States v. Elonis, 2011 WL 5024284, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 20, 2011)).
221
222
223
224
225

id
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330 (citing Virginiav. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003)).
Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60.
Id. at 360 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
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constituted a threat without having had a subjective intention to
threaten.226
Consider the cross burning attempt by Elliott and O'Mara. Assume
they had wanted Jubilee to become very afraid, even though they had no
intention of harming him or his family. In that case, they wanted to
communicate a threat (even though they knew that they had no intention
of carrying it out). A different situation involves an individual who
intentionally says something but does not intend for that statement to
make a threat, even though the hearer reasonably perceives what is said
as threatening. The former might be characterized as an empty threat,
while the latter might be thought not to be a threat at all, even though in
both cases the statement caused someone to be quite fearful and, perhaps,
to have taken steps to decrease the probability that a threat might
successfully be carried out.
B. Reversal of the Third Circuit
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit on statutory
grounds.227 While the Court clarified a few issues, it raised many more
questions than it answered and basically left for another day some of the
difficult issues that need resolution in this area.228
The statute under which Elonis was convicted reads: "Whoever
transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication
containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the
person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both." 22 9 The Court explained that the "statute
requires that a communication be transmitted and that the
Id. at 359-60 ("True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals."); see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
708 (1969) ("[P]olitical hyberbole" is not a true threat); R. A. V, 505 U.S. at 388. ("The
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat."); Elonis, 730 F.3d at 330 ("We
do not find that the unconstitutionality of Virginia's prima facie evidence provision
means the true threats exception requires a subjective intent to threaten.").
227 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001,
2012 (2015).
228 See id. at 2013-14 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("The Court
holds that the jury instructions in this case were defective because they required only
negligence in conveying a threat. But the Court refuses to explain what type of intent was
necessary. Did the jury need to find that Elonis had the purpose of conveying a true
threat? Was it enough if he knew that his words conveyed such a threat? Would
recklessness suffice? The Court declines to say. Attorneys and judges are left to guess."
(emphasis in original)).
229 18 U.S.C.A. § 875(c) (West
2015).
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communication contain a threat.230 It does not specify that the defendant
must have any mental state with respect to these elements." 231 For
example, "it does not indicate whether the defendant must intend that his
communcation contain a threat." 232 Indeed, the Third Circuit interpreted
the statute to require only that the accused intend "to communicate words
that [he] . . . understands, and that a reasonable person would view as a
threat."

233

Elonis argued that because he could not be convicted of violating the
statute unless he had intended to communicate a threat; 234 the state had to
establish that he had the intent to harm.235 But the Court rejected
Elonis's position, explaining that "an anonymous letter that says 'I'm
going to kill you' is 'an expression of an intention to inflict loss or harm'
regardless of the author's intent." 23 6 The Court concluded that "[a]
victim who receives that letter in the mail has received a threat, even if
the author believes (wrongly) that his message will be taken as a joke."237
Were the issue simply whether the Constitution requires the speaker
to have a subjective intent to harm before he can be convicted of making
a threat, then the Court would have sided with the Third Circuit rather
than Elonis. 238 But the issue was not so simple. The Court interpreted
the statute as implicitly incorporating a mens rea component, noting that
"the 'general rule' is that a guilty mind is 'a necessary element in the
indictment and proof of every crime."' 23 9 For example, consider an
individual who picks up "spent shell casings from a Government
bombing range, believing them to have been abandoned." 240 The Court
rejected that the mere fact that the individual picked up property
belonging to another sufficed for conviction. 24 1 To be convicted, the

230 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 at 2008.
231

id
id
233 Id. at 2007.
234 id
235 Id. at 2008.
236 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at
2008.
237 id
238 See id at 2012.
239 Id. at 2009 (quoting United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
250, 251 (1922)).
240 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009 (discussing the facts of Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952)).
241 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at
2009
232
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individual "had to know not only that he was taking the casings, but also
that someone else still had property rights in them." 242
Suppose that an individual mailed a letter to someone without
knowing the contents of the envelope, and that the letter contained a
threat against that person.
The individual would have knowingly
transmitted a communication (which in fact contained a threat), even
though the individual would not have intended to threaten anyone, much
less through interstate commerce. This innocent communication of a
threat would not have been subject to punishment.2 43
While the statute under which Elonis was convicted was not intended
to provide a basis for prosecuting the innocent communicator, a separate
question involves what mens rea is required when the statute is silent on
that issue.244 The Court announced that "[w]hen interpreting federal
criminal statutes that are silent on the required mental state, we read into
the statute 'only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful
conduct from otherwise innocent conduct."' 245 Yet, even here, the
Court's meaning was unclear. Negligent behavior is distinguishable from
innocent conduct, so one might have inferred that a showing of
negligence would have sufficed. But the Court made clear that mere
negligence did not suffice, 2 46 even while refusing to specify what mens
*247
rea was required.
The Court offered another example to illustrate its approach. Federal
law precluded individuals from using food stamps in an unapproved way,
e.g., buying goods at a store that charged more for products purchased
with food stamps than with a different payment method. 2 48 The Court
interpreted the statute to require the individual to have knowledge that
the store was engaging in the forbidden practice,249 although admitting
that Congress could have cast a wider net had it been so inclined. 25 0 But
242

id

243

Id. at 2011.

244

id
Id. (quoting Carterv. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).
246
See Elonis, 135 S. Ct at 2011-12.
247 Id. at 2012.
248 Id. at 2009-10 (discussing an example offered in Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S.
419 (1985)).
249 Id. at 2010 (citingLiparota, 471 U.S. at 425).
250 See id. at 2010 ("The Court noted that Congress could have intended to cover such a
'broad range of conduct,' but declined 'to adopt such a sweeping interpretation' in the
absence of a clear indication that Congress intended that result.") (citing Liparota, 471
U.S. at 427) (emphasis in original); see also Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427 ("Congress could
have intended that this broad range of conduct be made illegal, perhaps with the
understanding that prosecutors would exercise their discretion to avoid such harsh results.
245
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if Congress could have imposed a lower level of culpability had it been
so inclined, then Congress was not precluded from doing so. But if that
is so, then the Court's comments about imputing the "mens rea which is
necessary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent
conduct" 251 has to be interpreted in a particular way, i.e., suggesting that
where Congress has been silent with respect to the mens rea requirement,
the Court must impute a mens rea requirement that will not be met by
merely negligent behavior. 252
Of course, such a proposed rule of construction applies to federal law
generally 253 and is not only triggered when First Amendment issues are
implicated.254 After Elonis, in many of the cases in which it will be
claimed that the requisite mens rea has not been shown, the issue will not
be whether purely innocent behavior can nonetheless be criminalized,255
but the degree of culpability that must be established-negligence versus
some higher standard.256 But if the degree of culpability is the relevant
question, then it is at best regrettable that the Court wrote that "[f]ederal
criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act
without considering the defendant's mental state,"257 as if the issue were
simply whether innocent parties could be convicted under the statute.
At least one question raised by the Elonis opinion is what the jury
instruction should say. For example, it might suggest that an individual
should not be convicted of having made a threat unless he intended the
communcation to be perceived as a threat or, at least, knew that it would
be. 2 58 But such an instruction would not include an individual who,
while not knowing that the statement would be perceived as a threat, was
recklessly indifferent to whether it would be so perceived, and the Court
expressly "decline[d] to address"259 whether recklessness would meet the

However, given the paucity of material suggesting that Congress did so intend, we are
reluctant to adopt such a sweeping interpretation." (emphasis in original)).
251 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530
U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).
252 See Elonis, 135 S. Ct.
at 2010.
253 Id. at 2012.
254 id.
255 Id. at 2009 ("Although there are exceptions, the 'general rule' is
that a guilty mind is
'a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime."') (citing United States
v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922)). But see id at 2010 ("In some cases, a general
requirement that a defendant act knowingly is itself an adequate safeguard.")
256 See id at 2012.
257 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at
2012.
258 See
id
259 id.
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mens rea requirement. Perhaps the instruction quoted in the Third
Circuit opinion 2 60 should be amended to be something like:
A statement is a true threat when a defendant
intentionally makes a statement in a context or under
such
circumstances
wherein
[the
defendant
knew] . . . that the statement would be interpreted . . . as
a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily
injury or take the life of an individual [or where the
defendant "disregards a risk of harm of which he is
aware". 2 61
Would such an instruction protect too many messages reasonably
construed as threatening? That would be a matter for Congress to
address. On at least one reading of Elonis, Congress could amend the
statue at issue and specify a reasonable person standard, which would
make the Court's construction of the existing statute moot because the
employed interpretive presumption was only applicable to "federal
criminal statutes that are silent on the required mental state."262
In this case, Elonis knew his previous postings resulted in his wife
getting a protective order. While he might have thought that the order
should not have been issued,263 it does not seem credible for him to have
believed that his postings did not cause his wife to construe them as
threats, although he might have claimed that she was lying about her fear
and knew very well that he had no intent to harm her or the children.264
This would be for the jury to decide.
If Elonis knew that the previous postings were perceived by her to
have been threatening, it would be difficult to deny (credibly) that he did
not know his later postings describing his desire to kill his wife 2 65 would
be viewed as threatening. At the very least, the jury might find that he
either knew the statements would be perceived as threatening or that he
had a reckless disregard for how they might be perceived. But if that is
266
so and if recklessness is sufficient to meet the mens rea requirement,
260 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 327.
261 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Farmerv. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
262 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at. 2010 (majority opinion).
263 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
264 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 333.
265 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
266 Elonis, 135 St.
at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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then one would have expected the Third Circuit to have been able to
uphold the conviction because the correct instructions would have also
yielded a conviction and the instruction error was harmless.267
Elonis claimed that he was making these postings because doing so
was therapeutic. 2 68 But it was not as if he were writing this in his diary,
which he kept under lock and key. On the contrary, he made sure that his
ex-wife saw the writings.269 Ironically, the Court specifically mentioned
when the subject of Elonis's violent postings had not been alerted to their
existence and thus was not likely to see them, as if that were relevant to
the analysis, 270 but failed to focus on the great likelihood that Tara would
271
become aware of the postings on her sister's Facebook page.
The reversal of Elonis's conviction was surprising, given the facts of
the case. An extremely upset individual was making postings on the
internet "includ[ing] graphically violent language and imagery" 272 about
the person perceived to be causing him great pain. This was not a case
involving a negligent transmission of a private document containing
venting-Elonis made several postings to his sister-in-law's Facebook
page, e.g., suggesting that his son "should dress up as matricide for
Halloween," 273 a costume that might have included Tara's "head on a
stick." 274 One would need to be more than negligent not to realize that
Tara would have perceived these postings as threatening.
Suppose different facts.
An individual negligently posts on
Facebook something that he knows would be perceived as threatening.
Would that be subject to punishment? The Court implied (but did not
state) that the mens rea requirement would not be met in this case
either.275 Presumably, the posting of the statement would itself have to
be intentional or, at least, reckless in order to be prosecuted.
Suppose Elonis had threatened Tara in an email to his ex-sister-inlaw, who had forwarded that threat to Tara. Would Tara's sister be
267

Id. at 2018.

268

Id. at 2005 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2005 (majority opinion).
Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324.
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See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 ("The 'presumption in favor of a scienter requirement

should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct."') (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994))

(emphasis added).
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subject to prosecution for having knowingly transmitted a threat, even
though the purpose behind the transmission was to warn Tara so that
protective action could be taken? Certainly, a prosecutor might decide
not to prosecute such a transmission, but that would not speak to whether
the statute as written would include such behavior.2 76
The Elonis Court suggested that the intent to threaten was not an
element of the crime-the knowledge that the communication would be
perceived as threatening would suffice.277
But this opens up to
prosecution a whole range of communications that presumably were not
within the intent of Congress to criminalize. For example, assuming that
those televising the Klan rally at issue in Brandenburg2 78 knew that some
individuals living in the geographical area would find the telecast
personally threatening, would the television station executives have been
subject to prosecution? If not, why not?
Elonis' posting included some statements that might have been
interpreted as incitement of illegal activity:
Um, what's interesting is that it's very illegal to say I
really, really think someone out there should kill my
wife.
That's illegal.
Very, very illegal.
But not illegal to say with a mortar launcher.
Because that's its own sentence.
It's an incomplete sentence but it may have nothing to
do with the sentence before that. So that's perfectly fine.
Perfectly legal.
I also found out that it's incredibly illegal, extremely
illegal, to go on Facebook and say something like the
best place to fire a mortar launcher at her house would
be from the cornfield behind it because of easy access to
a getaway road and you'd have a clear line of sight
through the sun room.
Insanely illegal.
Ridiculously, wrecklessly, insanely illegal.
276 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) ("Congress could have intended

that this broad range of conduct be made illegal, perhaps with the understanding that
prosecutors would exercise their discretion to avoid . . . harsh results.") (emphasis in
original).
277
278

Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
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Yet even more illegal to show an illustrated diagram.

279

Presumably, were this posting construed as incitement, it could not
be prosecuted (say, under a different statute) 28 0 under Brandenburg,
because it would not be likely to result in imminent wrongful action.28 1
At some point, the Court will have to discuss whether and why as a
constitutional matter threatening material posted on the internet can be
prosecuted but inciting material posted on the internet cannot be
(assuming that the latter is not likely to lead to imminent lawless action).
In both kinds of cases, victims might be genuinely fearful and might also
be forced to take concrete steps to protect themselves and their families.
But the Elonis focus was not on the difficult balancing of the importance
of free speech on the one hand and the importance of protecting the
public on the other, so there has been no helpful guidance on how to
approach these thorny issues.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Elonis Court reversed a conviction based on a faulty jury
instruction.282 But the opinion was written in such a way that it is likely
to make a variety of legal matters more rather than less confusing if only
because the Court was not transparent with respect to what it was doing.
The Court may merely have been offering a rule of statutory
construction for federal criminal statutes where Congress has failed to
specify the required mens rea.283 But it is eminently foreseeable that
Elonis will be construed in other ways.284 Some may interpret the
decision to stand for the proposition that federal criminal law requires a
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280 Jennifer Spencer, No Service: Free Speech, the Communications Act, and
Bart's Cell

Phone Network Shutdown, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 767, 789 (2012) (discussing

commentators who "have argued that the Internet ... changes the traditional framework
for determining incitement of illegal activity").
281 See supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
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showing of more than negligence for conviction,285 which would mean
that convictions under federal law based on negligence may be at risk. It
would be unsurprising to see a conflict in the circuits about a variety of
federal convictions having nothing to do with speech, but because of
differing possible readings of Elonis. While it is not unusual for
Supreme Court decisions to be read in different ways, this decision
almost invites such conflicts, leading to decreased clarity in areas that
might previously have been thought fairly clear.
Following Elonis, what rules apply to Facebook postings? That is
unclear.286
Some individuals may (wrongly?) feel freer to post
statements that might reasonably be construed as threatening, especially
given the Court's reversal of a conviction of an individual subject to a
protective order who had posted statements reasonably construed as
threatening the very person protected by that order.287 Perhaps the Court
was trying to send a message to prosecutors that they as a general matter
should be more wary of prosecuting individuals who arguably made
threats, although the Elonis Court's focus on statutory construction
where Congress has been silent with respect to mens rea requirements
would likely mute such a message.
What is clear is that the Court has missed an opportunity to clarify
First Amendment law and provide more notice to internet users about
what kinds of postings are actionable. 288 Those interested in reconciling
or even understanding the differing constitutional approaches to
incitement, threats, and speech more generally should be sorely
disappointed by Elonis, and will simply have to hope that the Court
provides more guidance next time.
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